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 1 Introduction 
 Value Realism holds that there are evaluative facts that are objective, 
or stance-independent, in the sense that they exist independently of 
what we think or feel about them. On this view, facts such as pain being 
bad, knowledge being desirable, or helping others being admirable are 
as objective as facts postulated by the natural as well as the social and 
human sciences. But what would evaluative facts be? What, if anything, 
distinguishes evaluative facts from other kinds of facts? Is the value real-
ist just adding more grim facts to our ontology or are evaluative facts 
distinct? If evaluative facts are distinct, what is the difference with natu-
ral facts? A useful way to frame the problem is to ask what values are, if 
one were to follow Hilary  Putnam (2002 ) and accept that the fact/value 
dichotomy is a failure. Clearly, this question needs to be answered if we 
want to assess Value Realism. 
 Value Realism is opposed to Value Anti-Realism, the thesis that there 
are no objective evaluative facts. Both Value Realism and Value Anti-
Realism come in very different versions, which can each be paired with 
a variety of stances regarding the epistemology of values, the semantic 
of evaluative sentences, and the moral psychology of evaluative judg-
ments. 2 In spite of the large number of possibilities that results, some 
combinations are standard. Thus, Value Realism is generally associated 
with Rationalism, the view that the evaluative is grounded in reason, 
and which often takes the form of the epistemological claim that knowl-
edge of what are conceived of as  a priori evaluative truths can be gained 
through the exercise of reason. Quite generally, Rationalism is opposed 
here to Sentimentalism, the view that the ground of evaluative judgments 
lies in the sentiments or more generally in affective- cum -motivational 
states. Because they take affective and motivational states to be non-cog-
nitive, purely motivational states, sentimentalists most often reject Value 
Realism ( Nichols 2004 ,  Prinz 2007 ). 
 In this paper, we propose a defense of Value Realism that relies on 
the unusual combination of Value Realism with Sentimentalism. What 
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this account, which we call “Sentimental Realism,” holds, in a nutshell, 
is that what makes evaluative facts special is their relationship to emo-
tions. More precisely, Sentimental Realism claims that evaluative facts 
are fully objective facts, but that such facts are picked out by concepts 
that are response-dependent, in the sense that they are essentially tied to 
emotions. Our plan is as follows. We shall start with a presentation of 
Sentimental Realism and a discussion of its main virtues. On the basis of 
this, we shall discuss an objection to Value Realism that draws on evolu-
tionary considerations, the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. We shall 
argue that Sentimental Realism safely escapes from this dilemma. 
 Before we start, let us clarify the scope of our discussion. The norma-
tive domain can be divided into what belongs to the evaluative, which 
concerns the good and the bad as well as the different ways of being 
good and bad, such as  admirable or  courageous , on the one hand, and 
the deontic, which is exemplifi ed by concepts such as  ought ,  obligatory, 
forbidden , and  permissible , on the other. As should be clear from the 
terminology we used, our discussion focuses only on one part of the nor-
mative, namely, the evaluative. We have little to say in this paper about 
deontic facts, such as the facts that we ought to reduce pain or that it is 
forbidden to kill innocents. 
 2 Sentimental Realism 3 
 What makes Sentimental Realism a form of Sentimentalism is its commit-
ment to the thesis that evaluative concepts are essentially tied to affec-
tive states, and more specifi cally to emotions, such that such concepts 
count as being response-dependent. This claim is particularly plausible in 
the case of evaluative concepts such as  admirable, shameful ̧ or  amusing , 
which wear their response-dependence on their sleeves. As many have 
highlighted, a plausible way to spell out the response-dependence of such 
concepts is as follows: 
 (S) By conceptual necessity,  x is admirable/shameful/amusing/etc., if 
and only if admiration/shame/amusement/etc., is appropriate in 
response to  x , if one were to contemplate x. 4 
 There are very different ways to understand (S). A fi rst question that arises 
is how one should understand the equivalence. According to one reading, 
(S) consists in a conceptual analysis, in which evaluative concepts are 
broken down to what is taken to be simpler conceptual elements, namely, 
affective concepts and the concept of appropriateness (e.g., Chisholm 
1986, 58–60). The problem with this interpretation is that it is far from 
clear that affective concepts can be understood without appealing to 
evaluative concepts. How, for instance, could one explain the concept 
of admiration without invoking admirableness? In our view, it is better 
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to understand (S) as offering a conceptual elucidation—as opposed to an 
analysis—in which none of the two sides of the biconditional has con-
ceptual priority ( Wiggins 1987 ). On such a no-priority view, the grasp 
of evaluative and affective concepts would be interdependent, such that 
none would be considered more fundamental. A second question con-
cerns the notion of appropriateness, which can be taken to mean quite 
different things. According to some, such as Roderick Chisholm, appro-
priateness has to be explicated in terms of the deontic notion of require-
ment ( Chisholm 1986 , 58–60). Others, such as Thomas Scanlon spell out 
the equivalence in terms of reasons for the responses at stake ( Scanlon 
1998 , 95–100). We believe that a better way to understand such equiva-
lences is to claim that being appropriate in this context is to be correct 
from an epistemic point of view. 5 The idea is that someone is admirable, 
for instance, just if feeling admiration towards her is correct, or accurate, 
from an epistemological point of view. Put differently, an appropriate 
emotion is one that represents the evaluative facts as they are. 
 The worry that will immediately arise here is that understood this way, 
(S) is much too circular to be of interest. By proposing to elucidate eval-
uative concepts in terms of responses that are appropriate just if their 
objects fall under the concepts in question, the equivalence draws noth-
ing but an uninterestingly little circle. The circularity cannot be denied, 
but we believe that (S) is nonetheless of interest. As David Wiggins 
stressed when defending what he called “sensible subjectivism,” the aim 
is to “elucidate the concept of value by displaying its actual involvement 
with the sentiments. One would not [ . . . ] have suffi ciently elucidated 
what value is  without that detour” ( 1987 , 189). The point underscored 
by (S) concerns our epistemic “access” to values. To paraphrase Wiggins, 
the important point is that when we try to fi nd out whether something is 
admirable or shameful, for instance, there is nothing more fundamental 
to appeal to than our responses of admiration and shame. What this 
means is that (S) makes a point that concerns the epistemology of values. 
Clearly, the expertise in affective concepts involves the ability to feel the 
relevant emotions. Thus, (S) points toward the epistemic indispensability 
of our emotional responses. 
 Given this, it is easy to see that this account of evaluative concepts 
is compatible with the claim that evaluative facts are objective, in the 
sense of being stance- or response-independent. The emotion of admira-
tion toward someone can be appropriate only if in fact this person is 
admirable; and nothing prevents us from saying that the evaluative fact 
in question is objective. Indeed, on a natural understanding, it is because 
someone is objectively admirable that feeling admiration towards her is 
appropriate. Thus, what Sentimental Realism adds to (S) is the following 
claim: 
 (R) There are objective evaluative facts. 
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 Now, here too, there are different ways to go. In particular, (R) allows 
for both naturalist and non-naturalist versions, depending on how the 
relationship between evaluative facts and natural facts is thought of. 
According to radically non-naturalist versions, evaluative facts are  sui 
generis normative facts, which are distinct from natural facts. What is 
denied, more precisely, is that evaluative facts are identical or reducible 
to natural facts. What both non-naturalists and naturalists accept in gen-
eral, however, is that evaluative facts supervene on natural facts, in the 
sense, roughly, that there is no evaluative difference without a difference 
at the level of natural facts. The view we fi nd most plausible is that evalu-
ative facts not only supervene on the natural, but are constituted by natu-
ral facts that involve disjunctive natural properties. Whether this view 
should count as a form of non-naturalism or not is better left open here. 
 Sentimental Realism, the conjunction of (S) and (R), is clearly a pos-
sible account. But why would one want to embrace it? Independently of 
the reasons to embrace both (S) and (R), which we will briefl y discuss, 
we believe that the combination of the two claims makes for an attractive 
conception of values, which is in a position to answer important objec-
tions to Value Realism. 
 Let us start with the second conjunct, (R). Quite generally, as most 
would agree, (R) can be considered to be the default meta-normative 
position (Brink 1989). Indeed, this claim is even stronger in the case of 
values, where there is little motivation for the view that what we are 
concerned with are rules that are supposed to govern human interac-
tions. Evaluative predicates, such as ‘good’ or ‘admirable’, behave like 
ordinary predicates. Thus, the structure of ‘Sarah is admirable’ appears 
in no way different from that of ‘The ball is round.’ Both types of sen-
tences can be evaluated in terms of truth, for we can ask ‘Is it true that 
Sarah is admirable?’ just as we can wonder whether the ball is round. 
The two types of sentences appear to have cognitive contents that are 
genuinely truth-assessable. Similarly, when making evaluative judgments, 
we seem to express cognitive states that appear to be ordinary, truth-
assessable beliefs. Indeed, both our evaluative sentences and our evalu-
ative judgments seem to be about an objective evaluative reality, which 
exists independently of our own attitudes. This is evidenced by the fact 
that disagreement about value presents itself as genuine disagreement, in 
which at least one of the disagreeing parties makes a mistake. 6 According 
to the value realist, these considerations should be taken at face value. 
This means that, unless we have strong reason to think otherwise, we 
should admit that there really are objective evaluative facts and prop-
erties, which our evaluative judgments attempt to capture, and about 
which we disagree. 
 Let us turn to the other conjunct, (S). What supports (S) is that it cap-
tures the close relationship between the evaluative and the affective. Given 
the lexical proximity between terms such as ‘admirable’ and ‘admiration,’ 
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it is diffi cult to deny that such concepts are closely connected to affective 
concepts. This observation might suggest that being admirable is nothing 
but to be admired by someone. But in contrast to this subjectivist thesis, 
(S) is in a position to explain why what we  de facto admire is not always 
admirable, while what is admirable is not always what  de facto causes 
admiration. What (S) holds, is that it is only when admiration towards 
someone is appropriate that this person is admirable. Correlatively, given 
that it does not aim at reducing normative concepts to natural concepts, 
(S) does not fall prey to the natural fallacy, i.e., the error that consists in 
analyzing normative concepts in natural terms ( Moore 1903 ). 
 In our view, an important reason to adopt Sentimental Realism is that 
this approach is grounded in an independently plausible account of emo-
tions, namely, the Perceptual Theory. According to the Perceptual The-
ory, emotions are a kind of perceptual experiences, namely, perceptual 
experiences of evaluative facts. 7 The idea is that the admiration you feel 
towards someone represents that person as admirable, in the same way 
as color or shape experiences represent things as having color or shape 
properties. 
 The Perceptual Theory gains to be compared with its main competi-
tors, Feeling Theories ( James 1884 ,  Lange 1885 ,  Whiting 2011 ), Conative 
Theories ( Frijda 1986 ,  Scarantino 2014 ) and Judgmental Theories ( Solo-
mon 1976 ,  Nussbaum 2001 ). 8 By contrast to Feeling Theories, which 
hold that emotions are mere feelings, and Conative Theories, according 
to which emotions are constituted by motivational states such as desires, 
the Perceptual Theory holds that emotions are intentional states that 
have representational contents, in the sense that they represents things 
as having certain evaluative properties. It can thus easily account for the 
fact that emotions not only have intentional objects, but are naturally 
taken to be assessable in terms of the nature of these objects, fear being 
appropriate when it is directed at fearsome and dangerous objects. In 
contrast to Judgmental Theories, according to which emotions are nor-
mative or evaluative judgments, the Perceptual Theory holds that it is not 
necessary to have the ability to make evaluative judgments and to possess 
evaluative concepts to feel emotions. Thus, the Perceptual Theory has no 
diffi culty to account for the fact that non-human animals and infants can 
feel a number of emotion kinds, such as fear or anger. 
 This is not the place to spell out the full argument for the Perceptual 
Theory, let alone to consider the different objections that have recently 
been raised against it. 9 Let us simply note that the main argument for 
the Perceptual Theory is an argument by analogy. Emotions and sensory 
perceptual experiences share a number of striking features, the main of 
which are the following. Emotions and sensory perceptual experience 
both have phenomenal qualities, in the sense that there is a way it is like 
to feel an emotion, just as there is a way it is like to have sensory percep-
tions; they both are characterized by a lack of direct control by the agent, 
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in the sense that you cannot feel an emotion or have a sensory experience 
merely because you decide to do so; they both manifest “recalcitrance,” 
such as when you fear something which you judge to be harmless, or you 
see something as bent while you judge that it is straight. 
 Sentimental Realism is a promising account of evaluative facts con-
cerning the admirable, the fearsome, the amusing, the shameful, etc. But 
what about other kinds of evaluative facts, such as the fact that some-
thing is good or bad? What about facts involving properties that cor-
respond to so-called thick concepts, such as the fact that some action 
is courageous or some person generous? It is quite easy to see how the 
proposed account can be extended to the more general evaluative prop-
erties and their concepts. The basic idea is that one can use the general 
notions of positive and negative emotions to handle such cases. Let us say 
that to favor something is to have a positive emotion towards it, while 
to disfavor it is to have a negative emotion towards it. Given this, it can 
be claimed that something is good ( pro tanto ) just if it is appropriate to 
favor it, and something is bad ( pro tanto ) just if it is appropriate to dis-
favor it. Similarly, it seems plausible to tie thick concepts, such as  coura-
geous or  generous , to affective responses. For instance, it seems plausible 
to claim that an action is courageous just if it is done in spite of danger 
to oneself, and in virtue of this, it is admirable, so that admiring it would 
be appropriate. 
 Let us accept, then, that Sentimental Realism is a plausible account 
of the evaluative. One virtue of Sentimental Realism is that it allows for 
straightforward answers to two traditional objections to Value Realism, 
both of which can be traced back to John Mackie (1977, ch. 1). Mack-
ie’s so-called Argument from Queerness has two parts: one metaphysi-
cal (or ontological) and one epistemological. He claims that “[i]f there 
were objective values, they would be entities or qualities or relations of 
a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. 
Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some 
special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (Mackie 1977, 38). Accord-
ing to Mackie, objective evaluative facts provide “the knower with both a 
direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the 
person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it” ( Mackie 
1977 , 40). Since ordinary facts appear to lack the same action-guiding-
ness and motivational force, objective values look “queer.” So, we do 
best without objective evaluative facts in our ontology. 10 
 The good news is that Sentimental Realism is well-placed to answer 
both parts of the argument from queerness. In reply to the epistemologi-
cal challenge, Sentimental Realism can rely on the claim that emotions 
are perceptual experiences of values in order to develop an account of 
the justifi cation of evaluative beliefs, and more generally of evaluative 
knowledge, which grounds such beliefs on our emotional responses. 
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There are different ways to go here, but what seems plausible is that our 
emotions be considered to constitute defeasible reasons for our evalua-
tive beliefs, so that when we form a belief on the basis of an emotional 
reaction, our belief is  prima facie justifi ed (see  Tappolet 2000 ,  2016 , 
chap. 5; and  Kauppinen 2013 ,  inter alia ). In our view, the justifi cation of 
evaluative beliefs turns on the absence of any reason to believe that the 
emotion on which the belief is based be inappropriate. So, your belief 
that someone is admirable would be justifi ed on condition that it is based 
on the admiration you feel for that person, and you have no reason to 
believe that what you feel is biased or more generally has to be distrusted. 
One question that arises is how we go about determining what condi-
tions count as unfavorable. As David Hume stressed, fi nding out what 
conditions are favorable or unfavorable is something that we undertake 
with others. What Hume argues is that the very possibility of understand-
ing each other presupposes that we adopt what he calls a “common” or 
“general point of view,” that corrects for perspectival effects, such as 
biases due to spatial or temporal distance (1739–1740, III, 3, i). The idea 
is that in order to determine what counts as an unfavorable condition—
a defeater, in epistemological terms—we need to take into account not 
only our own experiences at different times and in different conditions, 
but also the experiences of other persons. 11 In Philip Pettit’s terms ( 1991 , 
600–1), when we want to determine whether something should count as 
a defeater, we have to look to our shared practice of discounting certain 
conditions as likely to interfere with our responses, a practice that aims 
at making sense of intra-personal, but also of interpersonal, discrepan-
cies. In any case, evaluative knowledge can then be conceived of in terms 
of justifi ed evaluative beliefs that are based on emotions that are not 
defeated. Suppose you form the belief that a friend is admirable on the 
basis of your feeling of admiration. Your belief will be justifi ed in case 
you have no reason to believe that your admiration is interfered with. 
But of course, your admiration might be nonetheless misguided. So, to 
know that the action is admirable, your belief need not only be justifi ed, 
it also needs to be such that  de facto no defeater interferes with your 
admiration. 
 Let us now address the metaphysical part of Mackie’s argument. Given 
that emotions normally come with related motivations, Sentimental-
ist Realism is also in a position to handle the challenges regarding the 
action-guidingness and motivational force of values. Value Realism is 
generally associated with a defense of the externalist thesis according 
to which evaluative judgments are not essentially, or necessarily, tied to 
motivation. Now, even though it can be agreed that making an evaluative 
judgment does not necessarily involve a motivation to act, Sentimental 
Realism can hold that evaluative judgments will normally be accompa-
nied by such a motivation, given that such judgments are grounded in 
the corresponding emotional reactions. This simply follows from the fact 
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that emotions, or at least most of them, at least normally involve motiva-
tions. So, insofar as evaluative judgments are concerned with facts that 
are relevant to what we ought to do, so that they are in this sense action-
guiding, they will normally involve a motivation to act accordingly. Given 
this, it is not necessary to postulate objective entities possessing magical 
motivational properties, in order to account for the motivational force of 
evaluative judgments. 
 If these arguments are on the right track, Sentimental Realism is an 
attractive account, which might well be better placed than other Value 
Realist accounts. But this does entail that Sentimental Realism is immune 
to all possible objections against Value Realism. 
 3  The Evolutionary Debunking Argument against 
Value Realism 
 In this part, we want to discuss one important objection, in particular, 
which has attracted considerable interest in recent years and which is 
known as the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Argument against 
Value Realism. 12 We shall argue that Sentimental Realism can success-
fully address this objection. We will proceed as follows. We will start 
by presenting the general version of the Evolutionary Debunking Argu-
ment. We will then show how the argument applies to the sentimental 
realist account proposed in the fi rst part of the paper. After presenting 
some replies offered in the literature, we will put forward a new ver-
sion of the “third factor argument” against the Evolutionary Debunking 
Argument. 13 
 The debunking argument starts from the empirical claim that evolu-
tionary forces have greatly shaped our evaluative faculties and that they 
have thereby disposed us to form specifi c evaluative beliefs. The argu-
ment proceeds by noticing that evolutionary forces aim at fi tness, not 
at detecting mind-independent evaluative facts. If so, we have reason to 
think that evolutionary forces have been selected for evaluative faculties 
that yield fi tness-enhancing beliefs, not beliefs tracking mind-independent 
evaluative facts. Indeed, it would be a massive coincidence—something 
akin to a miracle—if faculties shaped by forces that aim at survival and 
reproductive success also managed to deliver beliefs that track a stance-
independent evaluative reality. Thus, absent some other reason to think 
the contrary, we have decisive reason to conclude that our evaluative 
faculties are unreliable, i.e., that they tend to generate mistaken evalua-
tive beliefs. Insofar as Value Realism is an ontological and not an episte-
mological stance, this is not yet a conclusion that shows Value Realism 
to be wrong. However, the stark skepticism that would follow would put 
Value Realism in an uncomfortable position. 
 It is clear that Sentimental Realism is a target of the Evolution-
ary Debunking Argument. As we have seen, Sentimental Realism is 
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committed both to the existence of objective evaluative facts and to the 
possibility of having knowledge of such facts. More specifi cally, Senti-
mental Realism emphasizes the role of emotions, which are conceived of 
as perceptual experiences of evaluative properties, for the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge. This is where the Evolutionary Debunking Argu-
ment kicks in. According to it, sentimental realists must recognize that 
evolutionary pressures have exercised a large infl uence on our emotions. 
Indeed, from an evolutionary perspective, emotions (at least basic emo-
tions, that is, innate and pan-culturally shared emotions 14 ) can be seen as 
adaptations which gave our ancestors an evolutionary edge by allowing 
them to deal more effectively with the specifi c challenges that they typi-
cally encountered. If this is true, then it is hard to maintain that emotions 
reliably track genuine evaluative facts. For this to be true, it would have 
to be the case that reliably detecting objective evaluative facts somehow 
increased our ancestors’ fi tness. According to the debunker, however, this 
is scientifi cally questionable. There are two more plausible options. The 
fi rst consists in maintaining that emotions have nothing to do with evalu-
ative properties and that, insofar as they are perceptual experiences of 
some sort, they are perceptual experiences of non-evaluative properties 
whose detection was signifi cant for our ancestors’ survival, but which are 
uncorrelated to evaluative properties. The second consists in maintain-
ing that, while emotions are indeed perceptual experiences of evaluative 
properties, they are unreliable ones. Accordingly, when we experience an 
emotion towards a particular object, we perceive such an object as pos-
sessing an evaluative property that it does not really possess. Either way, 
the debunker’s line of thought implies that the evaluative beliefs that we 
regularly form on the basis of our emotions are likely to be systematically 
mistaken. 
 In what follows, we will understand the debunker’s challenge in the 
sense of the second option just mentioned. The reason is the following. 
For the sake of the argument, the debunker grants the assumption that 
there exists an objective evaluative reality. If evaluative properties exist, 
then, according to most emotion theorists, 15 they constitute the formal 
objects of emotions, where the formal object of an emotion type is what 
determines the correctness conditions of the tokens belonging to that par-
ticular type. For instance, the formal object of fear is the fearsome, while 
the formal object of admiration is the admirable. Moreover, if emotions 
are conceived of as perceptual experiences, then, insofar as their formal 
object determines their correctness conditions, it does so by determining 
whether the content of such emotions is correct or not. But if the formal 
object of a given emotion is constituted by an evaluative property, then 
it seems that the formal object determines whether the content of a given 
emotion is correct in the sense that such an emotion is assessed as cor-
rect if and only if, and because, it represents its object as possessing the 
relevant evaluative property and its object does indeed possess such a 
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property. From this account, it follows that emotions are unreliable only 
if they systematically misrepresent their objects as possessing evaluative 
properties that they do not really possess. Framed in these terms, the 
Evolutionary Debunking Argument claims that the objects of emotions 
possess properties that are of evolutionary signifi cance, but it adds that 
these properties do not correlate with the perceived evaluative properties. 
 Suppose we grant the evolutionary story about the origin of emotions. 
One may be tempted to insist that this does not necessarily spell trouble 
for Sentimental Realism. In fact, emotions admit some degree of plas-
ticity. So, even if we assume that emotions were selected for to track 
fi tness-enhancing properties and that such properties are not correlated 
with evaluative properties, emotions can nevertheless be “corrected,” 
e.g., by submitting them to rational scrutiny, in such a way to ensure 
that they reliably track genuine evaluative properties. Not only that, but 
if we think that emotions provide us only with the basis for particular 
evaluative judgments, which are then used as raw data to construct more 
general evaluative principles through a method of interpersonal refl ective 
equilibrium, then, to the extent that such a method leads us to abandon 
the particular evaluative judgments that are clearly mistaken, then we 
may also think that some degree of error in the initial data is not neces-
sarily an obstacle to the obtainment of evaluative knowledge. 
 However, things are not that easy. The debunker may reply, fi rst, that 
we have good reason to think that most of our emotions are incorrect 
and, second, that we have no independent way of identifying which of 
them are incorrect. Together, these points can be used to reject the sen-
timental realist’s initial reply. For a start, it follows from the debunker’s 
claims that we cannot simply assume that the standard defeaters (e.g., 
drugs, fatigue, cultural biases, etc.) constitute the only distorting infl u-
ences on otherwise correct emotions, since this is precisely what the 
debunker disputes. In fact, the debunker argues that we cannot make 
any substantive assumptions as to which emotions are correct, which we 
could then use to assess and “reprogram” our incorrect emotions, since 
such assumptions may simply be the product of our evolutionary history. 
If this is the case, and if we do have good reason to think that most of 
our emotions are unreliable, then no method that relies on our emotional 
responses as a starting point can lead us to evaluative knowledge. The 
method is as good as the data on which it operates and if the data are 
inadequate, then the method will deliver inadequate results. As it is often 
put: “Garbage in, garbage out.” 
 The situation may appear bleak for Sentimental Realism. However, 
appearances are often deceitful. Value realists of different brands have 
proposed various replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. The 
sentimental realist can co-opt at least some of them for her own purpose, 
as we will now show. 16 The starting point of the sentimental realist’s 
counterattack is the observation that the debunker cannot merely assert 
15032-0191d-1pass-r02.indd   185 09-09-2016   23:58:05
186 Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet
that, if emotions have been shaped by evolutionary forces, then most of 
them are incorrect. In other words, the debunker must give us some rea-
son to accept the claim that it would be a massive coincidence if mental 
states selected for fi tness were also reliable detectors of objective evalua-
tive facts. What does she have to say in this regard? 
 The natural option for the debunker consists in showing that, more 
often than not, our emotions lead us to form evaluative beliefs that we 
know, or can confi dently hold, to be incorrect. This would provide com-
pelling evidence that evolutionary forces aimed at survival do not track 
objective evaluative facts. However, as it should be clear by now, this 
strategy is not open to the debunker, for it would contradict her claim 
that we have no independent way of identifying which emotions are cor-
rect and which are incorrect and, most importantly, it would provide an 
easy way out to the value realist. 17 
 An alternative for the debunker consists in formulating her argument 
in terms of probabilities. If we cannot make any substantive assumptions 
about evaluative facts, then we are left with an essentially unlimited set 
of  possible evaluative facts. But then, it is extremely unlikely that evolu-
tion has endowed us with mental states that track precisely the  actual
evaluative facts. This gives us reason to endorse the massive coincidence 
thesis against Value Realism. However, as several authors have noticed, 18
this argument can be challenged. For one, we can resist its starting point 
and deny that, if we forbid all substantive assumptions, then we must 
take the space of possible evaluative facts to be infi nite. The reason is 
that there may be conceptual constraints on what counts as an evalua-
tive truth, which signifi cantly narrow down the set of possible evaluative 
facts. 19 Furthermore, the probabilistic argument seems to overgeneral-
ize. Indeed, if we assume that evolutionary forces have exercised a great 
infl uence on the development of our sensory perceptual capacities and 
if we avoid making any substantive assumptions about perceptual facts, 
then we must accept that the space of possible perceptual facts is infi nite. 
But then, we should conclude that it is extremely unlikely that capacities 
selected for survival ended up tracking precisely the actual perceptual 
facts. However, this does not seem to be a conclusion that debunkers 
would readily accept. 20 
 The debunker may explore other possibilities. One of these consists in 
claiming that, insofar as evolutionary forces have shaped our emotions, 
the latter are  insensitive to the evaluative facts, in the sense that our emo-
tions would not have been different, had we lived in a different possi-
ble world. 21 Indeed, had the evaluative facts been different, evolutionary 
forces would have still pushed us to experience the same fi tness-enhanc-
ing emotions (at least the same basic emotions), thereby getting us to 
form the same fi tness-enhancing evaluative beliefs. Given this, we should 
conclude that any match between our actual emotions and the evalua-
tive facts would be massively coincidental. A similar option consists in 
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claiming that, insofar as evolutionary forces have shaped our emotions 
and insofar as our evaluative beliefs are formed on the basis of such 
emotions, then our evaluative beliefs are not  safely formed. 22 Indeed, had 
we evolved differently, we would have experienced different emotions, 
which, in turn, would have led us to forming different evaluative beliefs. 
By our current light, however, such beliefs would have been false. This 
shows that our evaluative beliefs are simply the result of an accident of 
our evolutionary history. If so, their correspondence to a mind-independ-
ent evaluative reality would be massively coincidental. 
 However, both arguments can be challenged on general grounds. In 
fact, as Tomas  Bogardus (2016 , 644) has stressed, recent work in epis-
temology gives reason to believe that neither sensitivity nor safety is 
required for justifi ed belief and knowledge. So, even if we grant that our 
emotions might be insensitive or unsafe in the way suggested above, this 
has little implications on their epistemic status. In fact, both the argu-
ment from sensitivity and the argument from safety are part of a broader 
argument that aims at showing that emotions cannot lead us to evalua-
tive knowledge. However, if it is shown that neither sensitivity nor safety, 
in the technical sense at stake, matters for knowledge, then, the alleged 
failure of emotions to satisfy these conditions does nothing to support 
the claim that emotions are not reliable grounds for the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge. 
 One last possibility that we wish to consider is for the debunker to 
argue that, if evolutionary forces have shaped our emotions, then the best 
explanation of how we typically form our emotions does not presuppose 
their reliability. 23 For instance, one may argue that, to the extent that 
mind-independent evaluative facts are causally inert, then the best expla-
nation of how we form our emotions is simply that the latter are caused 
by those non-evaluative properties of their objects that were evolution-
arily salient for our ancestors’ survival. Thus, even if we grant that our 
emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties, we have no 
explanatory good reason to hold that they are reliable perceptual experi-
ences. The upshot is that it would be a massive coincidence, if they were 
actually reliable. 
 The most natural reply against this argument is for the sentimental 
realist simply to deny its starting point, namely, that evaluative proper-
ties are causally inert. After all, Sentimental Realism holds that evaluative 
knowledge is largely a kind of synthetic  a posteriori knowledge. This fi ts 
comfortably with the thesis that the evaluative is causally effi cacious. 
But the sentimental realist may also consistently opt for a weaker thesis, 
according to which, if evaluative properties supervene on causally effi ca-
cious non-evaluative properties, they possess causal power in a derivative 
way. Either way, the sentimental realist has an explanation of how we 
can have perceptual experiences of genuine evaluative properties that is 
at least as good as that proposed by her opponent. 
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 Let us take stock. So far, we have examined various arguments that the 
debunker may give in defense of her claim that the correlation between 
our actual emotions and mind-independent evaluative facts would be 
massively coincidental. We have seen that the sentimental realist has a 
reply to all of these arguments. However, a die-hard skeptic may not 
be satisfi ed by this essentially defensive strategy. She may insist that 
the alleged correlation between fi tness-relevant properties and evalua-
tive properties remains fi shy and ask the sentimental realist for a more 
positive defense. It is unclear whether the debunker is entitled to such 
a demand, without having herself provided more convincing evidence 
about the unreliability of our emotions. 24 Be that as it may, in what fol-
lows we want to put forward precisely an argument of this sort. Our 
argument is a version of an argument that has been variously explored by 
value realists of different sorts: the “third factor” argument. In its general 
form, third factor arguments consist in showing that there is (at least) an 
indirect correlation between fi tness-enhancing facts and objective evalua-
tive facts, in the sense that, there exists a “third factor” that is responsible 
for both and explains their correlation. Our goal in the rest of this section 
is to see how an argument of this sort can be constructed in defense of 
Sentimental Realism. 
 Following David  Enoch (2010 , 428), our starting point is the observa-
tion that, in order to reject the debunker’s challenge, it is not necessary to 
show that there exists a perfect correlation between our emotions and the 
objective evaluative facts. In other words, it is not necessary to show that 
all emotions are reliable. Rather, it is suffi cient to show that our emo-
tions are reliable more often than not. As we have seen, emotions provide 
the starting points for the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. However, 
reasoning mechanisms play an important role as well, and provided that 
they operate on mostly correct data, they can help us getting closer and 
closer to the evaluative truth, e.g., by eliminating inconsistencies and log-
ical mistakes, and by taking into account defeaters. Notice that this may 
be possible even if we do not know exactly which particular emotions are 
correct, provided that we know that they are  mostly correct. 
 How then can we proceed in order to show that our emotions are 
reliable more often than not? As we have seen, the debunker holds that 
evolutionary forces have selected for fi tness-enhancing emotions, that is, 
emotions providing evolutionarily relevant information for our ances-
tors and leading to behaviors that increased their chances of survival and 
reproductive success. The fi rst substantive step of our argument consists 
in claiming that, more often than not, whatever contributes to an indi-
vidual’s fi tness contributes also to the individual’s well-being. If this is 
true, then, by selecting for fi tness-enhancing emotions, evolution may 
have also selected for emotions that are, more often than not, well-being-
enhancing, i.e., emotions that either (a) favor, or lead to the promotion 
of, things that are good for the individual, or (b) disfavor, or lead to the 
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avoidance of, things that are bad for the individual. 25 Consider, as an 
example, a fairly universal emotion like the fear of snakes. Such an emo-
tion was obviously adaptive for our ancestors, in the sense that those 
who experienced such an emotion had more chances to survive that those 
who did not. By helping them survive, such an emotion had an impact 
also on their well-being, at the very least by ensuring that a preliminary 
condition for well-being be satisfi ed, namely, remaining alive. 
 The debunker may immediately raise an objection against this fi rst 
step. Isn’t the claim that, more often than not, whatever contributes to 
an individual’s fi tness contributes also to the individual’s well-being a 
substantive claim? And isn’t it precisely the sort of claim that is presump-
tively infected by evolutionary infl uences, so that it cannot be presup-
posed without begging the question against the debunker? In response, 
the sentimental realist may appeal to the idea, mentioned above, that 
there are some conceptual constraints on what counts as well-being and 
that denying the existence of even a weak correlation between individ-
ual fi tness and individual well-being would violate such constraints. In 
fact, in order to deny the fi rst step of our argument, the debunker would 
have to deny that the adoption of effective survival strategies contributes, 
more often than not, to the individual’s well-being, in the sense that it is, 
more often than not, benefi cial for the individual or in the individual’s 
interest. However, it is not clear whether this move can be defended with-
out threatening to make the resulting view unintelligible as a view of 
well-being. 
 Suppose, then, that the debunker’s objection can be resisted. The argu-
ment might be still thought to be very limited, since it establishes only a 
correlation between emotions and goodness for. In fact, if emotions are 
conceived of as perceptual experiences of non-relational evaluative facts, 
what we need in order to reject the Evolutionary Debunking Argument is 
a correlation between emotions and goodness  tout court . This is the goal 
of the second step of our argument. Once again, the debunker will be 
skeptical. After all, it seems that this requires defending another of those 
substantive claims that the debunker will take to be question-begging. In 
order to defuse the debunker’s worry, the sentimental realist can pursue a 
similar strategy as the one pursued with respect to the fi rst step. 
 As we have seen, emotions are conceived of as perceptual experiences 
of evaluative properties. More specifi cally, positive emotions are directed 
at things that supposedly possess positive evaluative properties, e.g., the 
property of being pleasurable, joyful, etc.; while negative emotions are 
directed at things that supposedly possess negative evaluative proper-
ties, e.g., the property of being fearsome, disgusting, etc. Our claim is 
that things that  do , in fact, possess properties of the former kind are 
also things that  tend to be good for the individual. Likewise, things that 
 do possess properties of the latter kind are also things that  tend to be 
bad for the individual. In order to deny these claims, one would have to 
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maintain that pleasurable, joyful, etc., things do not tend to be well-being-
enhancing, and that fearsome, disgusting things do not tend to be well-
being-diminishing. Arguably, this would once again render the resulting 
view unintelligible as a view of well-being. 
 These considerations have some important implications. They imply 
that,  if emotions were  reliable perceptual experiences of evaluative prop-
erties,  then they would typically be well-being-enhancing, since they 
would favor (or disfavor) things that tend to be good (or bad) for the 
individual. In fact, as we have seen above, fi tness-enhancing emotions 
are , more often than not, well-being-enhancing. Of course, it would be 
fallacious to infer from this that fi tness-enhancing emotions are, more 
often than not, reliable perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. 
However, if we combine the previous considerations with the claim that 
evaluative properties are causally effi cacious, then the thesis that fi tness-
enhancing emotions are, more often than not, reliable perceptual expe-
riences of evaluative properties appears to be  a plausible explanation
(perhaps,  the most plausible explanation) of why fi tness-enhancing emo-
tions are also, more often than not, well-being-enhancing. If this is the 
case, then the second step of our argument can be vindicated. 
 We want to conclude by considering one possible objection that the 
debunker may raise at this stage. According to it, our argument simply 
presupposes that our evaluative concepts are not subject to distorting 
evolutionary infl uences. However, this presupposition is illegitimate in 
the context of a discussion on the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. 
We wish to make two points in response. The fi rst is that conceptual 
assumptions about evaluative concepts seem to stand on fi rmer grounds 
than substantive assumptions about evaluative facts. Indeed, while the 
claims about the latter may refl ect the distorting effects of evolution on 
our emotions, the former seem to be relatively immune to such effects, 
since conceptual assumptions are more the product of rational refl ection 
than of our emotions, and we have no evolutionary grounds for think-
ing that rational refl ection is unreliable. The second point is that, as our 
previous discussion shows, the debunker has not given us any reason to 
think that our substantive assumptions are systematically mistaken. In 
fact, we have rejected all her arguments aimed at showing that our emo-
tions are unreliable. All in all, the sentimental realist seems thus to have 
the edge over her opponent. 
 4 Conclusion 
 Let us draw together the treads. We started out by asking what evalua-
tive facts, as compared to natural facts, would be if Value Realism were 
true. In reply, we argued that what is specifi c of the evaluative domain 
lies in its ties to the affective. Thus, we proposed a version of Value Real-
ism, Sentimental Realism, which combines the claim that evaluative facts 
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are fully objective, or stance-independent, with the thesis that evaluative 
concepts are characterized by response-dependence. We argued that Sen-
timental Realism is in a good position with respect to the Argument from 
Queerness as well as the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. In both 
cases, the emotions we feel did the heavy lifting in the counter-arguments. 
 Notes 
 1  We gratefully acknowledge the FRQ-SC and the SSHRC for their support, 
and wish to thank Samuel Dishaw for his useful comments. 
 2  Indeed, moral realism and anti-realism are often considered to involve more 
than an ontological stance. See Sturgeon (1984); Sayre-McCord (1988); and 
Railton (1996); and Tappolet and Rossi (2015a) for a general discussion. 
 3  This section draws partly on Tappolet and Rossi (2015a) and Tappolet 
(2016). 
 4  See Brentano (1889: 11); Ewing (1947, 1959); Wiggins (1976, 1987); Black-
burn (1984, 1998); McDowell (1985); Chisholm (1986); Gibbard (1990); 
Anderson (1993); Mulligan (1998); Scanlon (1998); D’Arms and Jacobson 
(2000a, 2000b); Oddie (2009),  inter alia . 
 5  The terminology is inspired by Brentano, who claimed that something is good 
if and only if loving it is correct ( richtig ) (1889: 11). See also Oddie (2014: 
66). 
 6  See Moore (1922); Enoch (2011: chap. 2). 
 7  See Meinong (1917); de Sousa (1987); Tappolet (1995, 2000, 2016); Prinz 
(2004); Deonna (2006); Döring (2007); Tye (2008). 
 8  See Deonna and Teroni (2012) for a useful overview of emotion theories. 
 9  See Tappolet (2016: ch. 1); and for objections, see Deonna and Teroni (2012); 
and Brady (2013). 
 10  As this formulation makes manifest, Mackie’s argument cannot concern nor-
mativity in general, including the epistemological normativity (see Putnam 
2002; Cuneo 2007). 
 11  This is an insight that has often been highlighted in recent discussions. See 
Wiggins (1987: 196); Davidson (1991); Pettit (1991, 600–601). 
 12  Amongst the authors that have put forward versions of the evolutionary 
debunking argument, see Joyce (2006); Kitcher (2006, 2011); Ruse and Wil-
son (1986); Ruse (1998); and Street (2006). 
 13  Amongst the authors that have defended this kind of argument, see Brosnan 
(2011); Enoch (2010, 2011); and Skarsaune (2010). 
 14  See Ekman (1972); Griffi ths (1997); and Cosmides and Tooby (2000). 
 15  See for instance, Kenny (1963); de Sousa (1987); Teroni (2007); and Deonna 
and Teroni (2012). 
 16  Amongst the value realists that offered some replies to the evolutionary 
debunking argument, see Berker (2014); Bogardus (2016); Brosnan (2011); 
Copp (2008); Enoch (2010 and 2011); FitzPatrick (2015); Kahane (2011); 
Huemer (2016); Shafer-Landau (2012); Skarsaune (2010); Vavova (2014 and 
2015); and Wielenberg (2010). 
 17  On this point, see also Shafer-Landau (2012) and Vavova (2014). 
 18  See Shafer-Landau (2012); and Vavova (2014, 2015),  inter alia . 
 19  We will come back to this line of thought below, when developing a “third 
factor” argument against the evolutionary debunking argument. 
 20  On this reply to the evolutionary debunking argument, see Shafer-Landau 
(2012, 12–13). 
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 21  For a discussion of the argument from sensitivity, see also Wielenberg (2010); 
Clarke-Doane (2012); Shafer-Landau (2012); and Bogardus (2016). 
 22  For a discussion of the argument from safety, see Bogardus (2016). 
 23  See Shafer-Landau (2012), especially 24–6. 
 24  For a similar point, see Vavova (2015, 105–6). 
 25  In Tappolet and Rossi (2015b), we argued that the claim that emotions have 
been selected for as fi tness-enhancing mechanisms does not entail the claim 
that emotions have been selected for as well-being-enhancing mechanisms. 
Furthermore, we have also argued that there exists no necessary relation 
between emotions and well-being. Both of these claims are compatible with 
the thesis defended here, according to which  some fi tness-enhancing emo-
tions are also well-being-enhancing emotions. 
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